The State of Utah v. Billy Jo Moyes : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
The State of Utah v. Billy Jo Moyes : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
G. L. FLETCHER; Attorney for Appellant;ROBERT B. HANSEN; Attorney for Respondents
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Moyes, No. 16845 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2078
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16845 
BILLY JO MOYES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The appellant, Billy Jo Moyes, appeals from a 
conviction of aggravated robbery in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
G. L. FLETCHER 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah BL 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
JUN 12 1981 
_.... ........................................... _., 
Clerk. Supr81fte Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPRE'ME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16845 
BILLY JO MOYES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The appellant, Billy Jo Moyes, appeals from a 
conviction of aggravated robbery in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
G. L. FLETCHER 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY BECAUSE 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT AS 
WELL AS TESTIMONY ON HIS 
BEHALF AS TO HIS BEING ELSE-
WHERE WHEN THE CRIME WAS COM-
MITTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
RAISE A REASONABLE DOUBT 
AS TO HIS GUILT . . . . 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS 
A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
APPELLANT AS THE MAN WHO 
COMMITTED THE ROBBERIES WAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT . 
CONCLUSION . . 
CASES CITED 
State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 
State V. Meacham, 455 P.2d 156 (1969) 
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975) 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 695 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 18 L.Ed. 2d 
1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 .... 
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d (1977) ... 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
6 
9 
10 
6 
6 
6 
8 
9 
6,7 ,8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
BILLY JO MOYES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The appellant, Billy Jo Moyes, appeals from a 
conviction of aggravated robbery in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Billy Jo Moyes, was found guilty 
by a jury with the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, pre-
siding in a trial concluding August 30, 1979. The 
defendant thereafter was committed to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to life 
for said conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and 
a new trial on the issue of whether or not there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State alleged that on April 1, 1979, the 
defendant committed two counts of aggravated robbery. 
The State further alleged that the first robbery occur-
red at a 7-Eleven store located at 4130 South Redwood 
Road where Janette A. Nye was the clerk on duty. The 
second robbery occurred approximately one half hour 
later at a 7-Eleven store where Dwight D. Camp was the 
clerk on duty. (T.p.10) 
The State next alleged that Ms. Nye testified 
that a man entered the 7-Eleven on Redwood Road at 
approximately 2:05 a.m. on April 1, 1979. She testified 
that this man was tall with a full beard and mustache, 
dark eyes, a gap in his teeth, and was wearing a green 
fatigue jacket. (T. p. 20) . She further testified that 
this man walked up to her with scissors in one hand and 
said "give me all the money." Ms. Nye then testified 
that she complied with this demand and gave the man the 
money in the register. After being ordered to place the 
money in a paper bag and complying with this demand, Ms. 
Nye was then ordered to open the safe. She told the man 
that she was unable to do so and was subsequently ordered 
into the cooler. After she walked into the cooler (which 
had a glass front) the man turned and walked out the 
front door of the store. Ms. Nye testified that the total 
amount of time elapsed was approximately three minutes. (T. 10 
-2-
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Ms. Nye testified that, as soon as the man left the store, 
she walked out of the cooler and called the oolice 
... . 
The clerk on duty at the second 7-Eleven store 
robbed on April 1 was Dwight Camp. Mr. Camp testified 
that at approximately 2:35 a.m. on April 1, 1979, a man 
walked in and yelled "hey, fella" to Mr. Camp. Mr. 
Camp turned around and looked at the man. Mr. Camp 
testified at trial that this man was approximately six 
feet, five inches tall with a red bandanna over his 
face, dark hair, dark eyes, well built, and wearing 
a green Army field jacket. Mr. Camp further testified 
that this man was holding a pair of scissors in one hand. 
After Mr. Camp turned around, the man described immediately 
above told Mr. Camp to give him all the money. Mr. 
Camp gave this man the money he had been counting as well 
as the rest of the cash in the register. After being 
given the money, the man pulled down his bandanna and 
stared at Mr. Camp for a few seconds. The robber then 
turned toward the door and walked out. 
Mr. Camp then testified that this man turned 
west towards a trailer park and disappeared on foot 
around the corner of the building. Mr. Camp testified 
that he immediately phoned the Sheriff's office, described 
what had happened and gave them a description of the man 
who had just robbed the store. (T. p.55-72). 
The description of the man who robbed this 
-3-
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second 7-Eleven went out to all the police officers 
on duty. A Deputy Sheriff was patrolling the area near 
4000 West and 3100 South and observed a car run 
a stop sign at this intersection. The Deputy pulled 
the car over and heard the description of the robbery suspect 
the ·same time as the man in the car he had stop~ed put 
his arm and head out of the window flashing his driver's 
license. The Deputy noticing a similarity in the 
description, ordered the man out of his car. Another 
Deputy arrived as this was going on, noticed another man 
in the car and ordered them both out. After searching 
both men for weapons, one of the Deputies searched the 
car and retrieved several items, including scissors 
and a brown paper bag with money in it. The suspect, the 
appellant, was then booked into custody. (T. p.96~105). 
The appellant testified at trial that he arrived 
at a party at 10:45 with a friend. He was drinking at the 
party and left the party at approximately 1:05 a.m. on 
April 1 with his friend. From there, the appellant testi-
fied that he went to the 7-Eleven at 1157 West 1300 South 
to buy a six-pack of beer. He described a conversation 
with the clerk at this 7-Eleven in which the appellant 
persuaded the clerk to sell him some beer although it was 
illegal to do so after 1:00 a.m. Appellant further testified 
that he went to the parking lot where he found a puppy 
which he picked up and took home to his daughter. 
(T. p.222-224). 
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After talking with his wife for fifteen to 
twenty minutes, appellant's wife testified that she stated 
that they would need some dog food and suggested that he 
go to Harmon's to get some. Appellant and his friend left 
the house and proceeded to Harmon's to buy dog food. 
Appellant testified that he did not drive fast going to or 
leaving Harmon's because it was snowing. After buying 
several items at Harmon's, appellant and his friend left 
the store. He testified the shopping took approximately 
one half hour. (T. p.224-225). 
After leaving the store, appellant testified 
that he proceeded down 40th West to 31st and turned 
right. He pumped his brakes to stop the car, but 
testified that he started to slide and accellerated in 
order to avoid sliding off the road. Appellant testified 
that soon after running this stop sign he noticed that a 
polic car was attempting to pull him over. He testified 
that he thought he was about to be arrested for drunk 
driving. (T. p.227-229). 
Another officer arrived at the scene and ordered 
both men out of the car. One of the deputies searched 
the car and discovered scissors under the seat as 
well as a bag containing some money. At this point the 
appellant was taken into custody. 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY BECAUSE TESTIMONY 
OF DEFENDANT AS WELL AS TESTIMONY ml HIS 
BEHALF AS TO HIS BEING ELSE\"7HERE WHEN THE 
CRIME WAS COMMITTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
RAISE A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT. 
It is well settled that a reviewing court 
has the authority to review a case on sufficiency of 
the evidence. The standard for review was clearly 
stated in State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977): 
In order for the defendant to success-
fully challenge and overturn a verdict on 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
it must appear that upon so viewing the evi-
dence, reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime. 565 P.2d 68. 
See Also State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387. 
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975), this 
court also addressed when sufficiency of the evidence 
must be challenged: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain his conviction, it must appear 
that viewing the evidence and all inferences 
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury, reasonable minds could not 
believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 530 P.2d at 1272. 
In this case, appellant contends that there 
was sufficient evidence of him being elsewhere and thus 
a reasonable doubt is raised. In State v. Meacham, 455 P.2d 
156 (1969) the court specifically addressed this: 
-6-
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. . . it is nevertheless the burden of the 
State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt; and if the evidence 
of the defendant's being elsewhere is suf-
ficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his 
being involved in the crime, he should be 
acquitted. 456 P.2d at 158. 
See also State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d (1977) 66 at 68 
which again addresses this issue: 
The burden is upon the State to prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and if 
the evidence with respect to any defense, 
e.g., in this instance alibi, is sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted. 
In this case, appellant contends that the 
evidence was not sufficient and that reasonable jurors 
could not have found him guilty. Defendant testified 
that he had gone to a party with a friend, left the party 
with the same friend and stopped at a 7-Eleven at 1:10 a.rn. 
in order to buy some beer. This was corroborated by 
testimony from George Farnsworth, an employee of the 
7-Eleven on California Avenue. After leaving the 7-Eleven 
with a stray puppy, the appellant went back to his home . 
. The appellant's wife also testified that the appellant 
left shortly after 10:00 p.m. to go to a party with a 
friend and returned home with a puppy at approximately 
1:30. Both the appellant and his wife further testified 
that they talked for about fifteen to twenty minutes and 
decided that the appellant should go out for dog food. 
Appellant left his house, went to a Harmon's grocery 
store, bought several items and was returning home when he 
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was stopped by a police officer for running a stop sign. 
Appellant contends that the physical evidence 
introduced by the state at trial is also insufficient 
because the defense testimony of appellant and his 
wife is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, which is 
the standard set out by State v. Wilson, supra. 
The appellant!s wife testified that the scissors 
found under the seat belonged to her. She had placed the 
scissors under the seat of the car because she was going 
to a friend's house to do some sewing and wanted them 
out of the reach of her daughter. Appellant 
testified that the money found inside 
the paper bag in the car had b~en there for four or 
five days. He explained that the money was part of a 
check he'd cashed and the amount in the bag had been 
set aside for his wife's birthday. 
Again, it is important to point out that this 
court, in a recent case, held that it is sufficient for 
acquittal that the evidence or lack thereof creates a 
reasonable doubt as to any element of the crime (State 
v. Torres, 619 P.2d 695). Here , it is obvious the 
appellant, through his testimony, has more than met the 
standard of a reasonable doubt. 
-8-
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION AS A Ml\TTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT AS THE MAN WHO 
COMMITTED THE ROBBERIES WAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellant contends that his conviction in 
part was obtained from identification made by both Ms. 
Nye and Mr. Camp. Appellant further contends that testi-
mony at trial raised a reasonable doubt as to whether 
he was the person who committed the robberies. The 
difficulties of accurate eyewitness identification 
are well known. Justice Brennan made this point 
quite clearly in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
18 L.Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926) = 
The vagaries of eyewitness identification 
are well-known; the annals of criminal 
law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
once said: "What is the worth. of 
identification testimony even when uncontra-
dicted? The identification of strangers 
is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards 
of such testimony are established by a formid-
able number of instances in the records of 
English and American trials. These instances 
are recent -- not due to the brutalities of 
ancient criminal procedure." The case of 
Sacco and Vanyetti 30 (1927). 
18 L.Ed. 2d at 1158. 
Appellant introduced testimony at trial from 
Iwana Wall who testified that she had mistaken another 
man for the appellant on several occasions due to the 
remarkable similarity between the two men. 
Another witness for the appellant, Jeryl Johnson, 
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testified that he also saw a man whom he mistook for the 
appellant, but later realized was someone else. He 
further testified that his confusion about this person's 
identity took place at a distance of approximately two 
feet. 
The man frequently mistaken for the appellant, 
James Curtis, also testified at trial. He testified that 
he had been mistaken for the appellant. He further 
testified that he is approximately the same height as 
the appellant as well as showing the jury that he has 
a gap in his front teeth. 
It is appellant's contention that ample 
evidence was put on at trial which demonstrated the 
remarkable resemblance between the appellant and 
Mr. Curtis. It is appellant's further contention that, 
given this confusion over identity, a reasonable 
doubt exists as to whether or not appellant was the 
person who cormnitted the robberies. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the evidence presented 
by the State at trial is inconsistent with appellant's 
testimony as to his whereabouts when the robberies 
occurred. The evidence is thus insufficient to 
sustain a conviction for the crime of aggravated robbery. 
Appellant further contends that the testimony 
of witnesses as to their confusion of appellant with 
someone else gives rise to a reasonable doubt that appellant 
-1 ()_ 
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was the one who committed the crimes. Thus, there is 
insufficient evidence and appellant contends that 
reasonable jurors could not have found that he was the 
one who committed the aggravated robberies. 
Therefore, appellant asks that his conviction 
be reversed and judgment of acquittal be entered or, in 
the alternative, that he be granted a new trial. 
DATED this _',_ day of 
-11-
' 1981. 
------
Respectfully submitted, 
G. L. FLETCHER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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foregoing o the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
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day of June, 1981. 
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